Texas
I am seeking dismissal due to presumptively prejudicial for the failure to give timely discovery which resulted in the failure to grant me my Constitutional Sixth Amendment right.
Plano municipal judge McCarthy informed me to ask the Court, in writing, to rule on a judgment to potential dismiss my case prior to my August 17, 2017 pre-trial/hearing due to my circumstance. Therefore, I am electing this recommended option in writing on citation #E258530 issued on May 2, 2017.
When my motion to discover went unanswered, I filed a copy with the court desk on June 6, 2017 for the pre-trial judge to see. At my initial pre-trial/hearing on June 8, 2017, the DA office still have not responded to my discovery. The pre-trial judge rescheduled the pre-trial/hearing date to July 25, 2017 and informed me this outcome will give reasonable time for the discovery process. At this point, I have missed a day worth of work-pay in order to find out I have to miss another day worth of work-pay on July 25 to come to court for another pre-trial/hearing.
The deferment of the pre-trial was suppose to allow the DA office more time to respond and then allow me a reasonable time to evaluate the evidence requested from the plaintiff, but the DA office continue not to respond for over 35 days. Then, the DA office chose to respond with a certified letter delivered to me on the Saturday before my pre-trial/hearing date with a written response stating that I need to take the time to make an appointment to review evidence with only one working day before my July 25 pre-trial/hearing to complete my discovery. I do not think this circumstance created by the action of the DA office is fair and reasonable, which I voiced out to the judge on July 25 pre-trial/hearing. As a result, my pre-trial/hearing is again rescheduled to August 17, 2017. Does the action taken by the DA office causing me to miss days and days of work-pay by coming to court again and again break my Constitutional Sixth Amendment right?
In addition to this unfairness, the DA office is not willing to provide the particular requested evidence, but instead what it determines is available for inspection, such as a copy of the citation, copy of defendant's driver license, and etc. For examples of requested evidence still not fulfilled: 1) What is the margin of error on the speed measuring noted "radar" device? 2) What are the time records of the noted device calibration and external accuracy testing on 05/02/2017?
In the case of the State of Minnesota v. Gerdes, the speed measuring device's accuracy has to be tested with an External source or an actual test run with accurately calibrated speedometer of a vehicle.
In the case of the State of Connecticut v. Tomanelli, a test of calibration must be done before and also after the defendant's speed was recorded.
In the case of the People of New York v. Periman, the speed measuring device was not proven to be accurate since no External test had been performed before or after violation.
In the case of the State of Wisconsin v. Hanson, accuracy testing was done without the speed measuring unit's own internal calibration device being used.
In the case of the State of Florida v. Allweiss, the accuracy testing method furnished by speed measuring device manufacturer are legally insufficient; it is merely an extension and part of the total speed measuring apparatus.
All these cases significantly establish the criteria of testing before and after a citation is issued with a speed measuring device.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the defendant to move the court to discover certain material, including relevant results or reports of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, such as the need for the user, not the manufacturer, to test and calibrate the "radar" speed detecting device's accuracy, prior and subsequently, on the day when a citation is issued as a result of this device usage. This discovery allowance will assist the defendant to collect facts for the pre-trial. Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 Neb.L.Rev. 127 (1962) supports this particular discovery which the DA office did not fulfill. What prompted me to motion this particular discovery is that both my car speedometer and gps speedometer noted a speed less than what was cited by the police officer and his "radar" speed detecting device. Rule 16, Information Subject to Disclosure, also states that the plaintiff must permit a defendant to inspect the results or reports of any scientific test or experiment, books, papers, documents, data, tangible objects, or portions of any of these items if the item is material to preparing the defense. Therefore, the citation day's accuracy testing records (both how and when), the written specifications of the "radar" speed detecting device (including the margin of error and the make and model of device), the recorded External source or an actual test run results with accurately calibrated speedometer of a vehicle are items material for preparing the defendant's decision making.
I am seeking dismissal due to presumptively prejudicial for the failure to give timely discovery which resulted in the failure to grant me my Constitutional Sixth Amendment right.
Plano municipal judge McCarthy informed me to ask the Court, in writing, to rule on a judgment to potential dismiss my case prior to my August 17, 2017 pre-trial/hearing due to my circumstance. Therefore, I am electing this recommended option in writing on citation #E258530 issued on May 2, 2017.
When my motion to discover went unanswered, I filed a copy with the court desk on June 6, 2017 for the pre-trial judge to see. At my initial pre-trial/hearing on June 8, 2017, the DA office still have not responded to my discovery. The pre-trial judge rescheduled the pre-trial/hearing date to July 25, 2017 and informed me this outcome will give reasonable time for the discovery process. At this point, I have missed a day worth of work-pay in order to find out I have to miss another day worth of work-pay on July 25 to come to court for another pre-trial/hearing.
The deferment of the pre-trial was suppose to allow the DA office more time to respond and then allow me a reasonable time to evaluate the evidence requested from the plaintiff, but the DA office continue not to respond for over 35 days. Then, the DA office chose to respond with a certified letter delivered to me on the Saturday before my pre-trial/hearing date with a written response stating that I need to take the time to make an appointment to review evidence with only one working day before my July 25 pre-trial/hearing to complete my discovery. I do not think this circumstance created by the action of the DA office is fair and reasonable, which I voiced out to the judge on July 25 pre-trial/hearing. As a result, my pre-trial/hearing is again rescheduled to August 17, 2017. Does the action taken by the DA office causing me to miss days and days of work-pay by coming to court again and again break my Constitutional Sixth Amendment right?
In addition to this unfairness, the DA office is not willing to provide the particular requested evidence, but instead what it determines is available for inspection, such as a copy of the citation, copy of defendant's driver license, and etc. For examples of requested evidence still not fulfilled: 1) What is the margin of error on the speed measuring noted "radar" device? 2) What are the time records of the noted device calibration and external accuracy testing on 05/02/2017?
In the case of the State of Minnesota v. Gerdes, the speed measuring device's accuracy has to be tested with an External source or an actual test run with accurately calibrated speedometer of a vehicle.
In the case of the State of Connecticut v. Tomanelli, a test of calibration must be done before and also after the defendant's speed was recorded.
In the case of the People of New York v. Periman, the speed measuring device was not proven to be accurate since no External test had been performed before or after violation.
In the case of the State of Wisconsin v. Hanson, accuracy testing was done without the speed measuring unit's own internal calibration device being used.
In the case of the State of Florida v. Allweiss, the accuracy testing method furnished by speed measuring device manufacturer are legally insufficient; it is merely an extension and part of the total speed measuring apparatus.
All these cases significantly establish the criteria of testing before and after a citation is issued with a speed measuring device.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the defendant to move the court to discover certain material, including relevant results or reports of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, such as the need for the user, not the manufacturer, to test and calibrate the "radar" speed detecting device's accuracy, prior and subsequently, on the day when a citation is issued as a result of this device usage. This discovery allowance will assist the defendant to collect facts for the pre-trial. Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 Neb.L.Rev. 127 (1962) supports this particular discovery which the DA office did not fulfill. What prompted me to motion this particular discovery is that both my car speedometer and gps speedometer noted a speed less than what was cited by the police officer and his "radar" speed detecting device. Rule 16, Information Subject to Disclosure, also states that the plaintiff must permit a defendant to inspect the results or reports of any scientific test or experiment, books, papers, documents, data, tangible objects, or portions of any of these items if the item is material to preparing the defense. Therefore, the citation day's accuracy testing records (both how and when), the written specifications of the "radar" speed detecting device (including the margin of error and the make and model of device), the recorded External source or an actual test run results with accurately calibrated speedometer of a vehicle are items material for preparing the defendant's decision making.
