Ohiogal
Queen Bee
What is the name of your state (only U.S. law)? Nationwide
The holding: Assuming for the sake of argument that the biological father is a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act, neither of the two sections at issue bars the termination of his parental rights.
Win for adoptive parents. Loss for biological parents. Not a clear cut decision:
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and BREY-ER, J., filed concurring opinions. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KA-GAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.
The holding: Assuming for the sake of argument that the biological father is a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act, neither of the two sections at issue bars the termination of his parental rights.
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), which establishes federal standards for state-court child custody proceedings involving Indian children, was enacted to address “the consequences . . . of abusive child welfare practices that [separated] Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes,” Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30, 32. As relevant here, the ICWA bars involuntary termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result fromthe parent’s “continued custody” of the child, 25 U. S. C. §1912(f);conditions involuntary termination of parental rights with respect toan Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made toprevent the “breakup of the Indian family,” §1912(d); and providesplacement preferences for the adoption of Indian children to membersof the child’s extended family, other members of the Indian child’s tribe, and other Indian families, §1915(a). While Birth Mother was pregnant with Biological Father’s child, their relationship ended and Biological Father (a member of theCherokee Nation) agreed to relinquish his parental rights. Birth Mother put Baby Girl up for adoption through a private adoptionagency and selected Adoptive Couple, non-Indians living in SouthCarolina. For the duration of the pregnancy and the first four months after Baby Girl’s birth, Biological Father provided no financial assistance to Birth Mother or Baby Girl. About four months after Baby Girl’s birth, Adoptive Couple served Biological Father with notice of the pending adoption. In the adoption proceedings, BiologicalFather sought custody and stated that he did not consent to the adoption. Following a trial, which took place when Baby Girl was two Couple’sadoption petition and awarded custody to Biological Father. At the age of 27 months, Baby Girl was handed over to Biological Father,whom she had never met. The State Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the ICWA applied because the child custody proceeding related to an Indian child; that Biological Father was a “parent” under the ICWA; that §§1912(d) and (f) barred the termination of his parental rights; and that had his rights been terminated, §1915(a)’sadoption-placement preferences would have applied.
Held:
1. Assuming for the sake of argument that Biological Father is a“parent” under the ICWA, neither §1912(f) nor §1912bars thetermination of his parental rights.
Win for adoptive parents. Loss for biological parents. Not a clear cut decision:
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and BREY-ER, J., filed concurring opinions. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KA-GAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.
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