What is the name of your state (only U.S. law)?
Good stuff your last post. Thank you. I can't seem to respond to yours via the original thread. So I'll do so here.
For what it is worth here is the mentioned 2008 Illinois statute (725 ILCS 5/115-10.6), which the defense’s ex post facto theory prefers to label, “ Drew’s Law”. It became effective 12/08/08 and provides:
“(a) A statement is not rendered inadmissible by the hearsay rule if it is offered against a party that has killed the declarant in violation of clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 *intending to procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness in a criminal or civil proceeding.
(b) While intent to procure the unavailability of the witness is a necessary element for the introduction of the statements, it need not be the sole motivation behind the murder, which procured the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.
(c) The murder of the declarant may, but need not, be the subject of the trial at which the statement is being offered. If the murder of the declarant is not the subject of the trial at which the statement is being offered, the murder need not have ever been prosecuted.
(d) The proponent of the statements shall give the adverse party reasonable written notice of its intention to offer the statements and the substance of the particulars of each statement of the declarant.
For purposes of this Section, identifying the location of the statements in tendered discovery shall be sufficient to satisfy the substance of the particulars of the statement.
(e) The admissibility of the statements shall be determined by the court
at a pretrial hearing.
At the hearing, the proponent of the statement bears the burden of establishing 3 criteria by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) first, that the adverse party murdered the declarant and that the murder was intended to cause the unavailability of the declarant as a witness;
(2) second, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statements provide sufficient safeguards of reliability;
(3) third, the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
(f) The court shall make specific findings as to each of these criteria on the record before ruling on the admissibility of said statements.
(g) This Section in no way precludes or changes the application of the existing common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. “
_______________________
One news article conjectured that the incriminating evidence which the defense is desperately attempting to exclude . . .
“Possibly includes letters of protection in which the third wife Savio said Peterson would kill her to shut her up and her sister's testimony to a coroner's jury that Savio told her family it would be no accident if she died. “
[*] Note: The referenced sections 9-1 (a)(1) and (2) of Illinois’ Criminal Code [720 ILCS 5/9-1] pertains to acts of homicide without lawful justification.
Good stuff your last post. Thank you. I can't seem to respond to yours via the original thread. So I'll do so here.
For what it is worth here is the mentioned 2008 Illinois statute (725 ILCS 5/115-10.6), which the defense’s ex post facto theory prefers to label, “ Drew’s Law”. It became effective 12/08/08 and provides:
“(a) A statement is not rendered inadmissible by the hearsay rule if it is offered against a party that has killed the declarant in violation of clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 *intending to procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness in a criminal or civil proceeding.
(b) While intent to procure the unavailability of the witness is a necessary element for the introduction of the statements, it need not be the sole motivation behind the murder, which procured the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.
(c) The murder of the declarant may, but need not, be the subject of the trial at which the statement is being offered. If the murder of the declarant is not the subject of the trial at which the statement is being offered, the murder need not have ever been prosecuted.
(d) The proponent of the statements shall give the adverse party reasonable written notice of its intention to offer the statements and the substance of the particulars of each statement of the declarant.
For purposes of this Section, identifying the location of the statements in tendered discovery shall be sufficient to satisfy the substance of the particulars of the statement.
(e) The admissibility of the statements shall be determined by the court
at a pretrial hearing.
At the hearing, the proponent of the statement bears the burden of establishing 3 criteria by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) first, that the adverse party murdered the declarant and that the murder was intended to cause the unavailability of the declarant as a witness;
(2) second, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statements provide sufficient safeguards of reliability;
(3) third, the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
(f) The court shall make specific findings as to each of these criteria on the record before ruling on the admissibility of said statements.
(g) This Section in no way precludes or changes the application of the existing common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. “
_______________________
One news article conjectured that the incriminating evidence which the defense is desperately attempting to exclude . . .
“Possibly includes letters of protection in which the third wife Savio said Peterson would kill her to shut her up and her sister's testimony to a coroner's jury that Savio told her family it would be no accident if she died. “
[*] Note: The referenced sections 9-1 (a)(1) and (2) of Illinois’ Criminal Code [720 ILCS 5/9-1] pertains to acts of homicide without lawful justification.