Here are just a couple tidbits from CPOLS (our legal sourcebook as published by the CA Attorney General):
In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (Stansbury (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322, quoting from Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125; Joseph R. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 954, 960.)
Furthermore, this question must be assessed objectively, which means two things. First, custody is based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his or her own circumstances. Second, in making a custody determination, officers are only expected to be aware of, and take into account, objectively apparent facts. Officers are not expected to anticipate the “frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question.” (Berkemer (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442, fn. 2.)
For example, police officers cannot be expected to be aware of a suspect’s prior experience with law enforcement and speculate as to how that experience affects the suspect’s own perception as to whether he is in custody. Similarly, officers cannot be expected to take into account the juvenile status of a 17-year-old suspect if the suspect’s appearance does not suggest youth. (Alvarado (2004) 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2152.)
Further, it goes on to clarify that the prior experience of the individual being questioned is not relevant to the issue of whether the police need to Mirandize or not. Because the defendant may later claim that he feared leaving because of some past experience or preconception, unless that fear was manifested in some obvious way to the police, they cannot be expected to take that in to account.
Thus, all because he may have FELT he could not leave, the reasonable person standard would still have to be applied - Would a reasonable person have felt he was able to leave upon request?
Neither the thoughts of the suspect nor the undisclosed thoughts of the officer make any difference. "Our decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." (Stansbury (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323; Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 384; Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.)
- Carl