Do Minors Have a Constitutional Right to Participate in a Visitation Hearing?
In re A.G., a minor child, Case no. 2012-2097
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Ottawa County)
ISSUE: When a court denies a minor the opportunity to participate in a trial in which he or she has a direct interest, is that denial a violation of the minor’s constitutional right to due process?
BACKGROUND:
The parents of a minor, identified in this case by her initials, A.G., divorced in 2001, when A.G. was 5 years old. During the years leading up to and following the divorce, her parents battled over custody of their daughter. Each parent has at different times had custody of A.G., and both have taken her out of the country to avoid custody orders.
In September 2009, A.G.’s father sought unsupervised visitation with his then teenage daughter from the juvenile court. A.G. countered with a motion to end all visitations with her father. She also asked the court to allow her to attend and participate in the proceedings. The trial court denied both of A.G.’s requests and granted unsupervised visitation to the father. A.G.’s attorneys appealed the decision to the Sixth District Court of Appeals.
In their appeal, A.G.’s attorneys argued in part that the trial court’s denial of A.G.’s request to attend the hearing violated her due process rights under the U.S. and Ohio constitutions. The Sixth District determined that the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure don’t apply to proceedings that determine parent-child relationships, including hearings about custody and visitation rights. Also, A.G. had an attorney present at the hearing, and she had recorded an interview to express her wishes to the court. Given these findings, the appeals court ruled that the trial court’s decision to not allow A.G. to be present at the hearing was not an error. Attorneys for the minor appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Attorneys for A.G. argue in their brief to the Supreme Court that if the juvenile rules don’t apply in this case, as the Sixth District ruled, then the court must rely on the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. They assert that the civil rules don’t specifically prohibit a child’s participation in a hearing and the rules apply to all persons, regardless of age.
If the juvenile rules do apply in this case, contrary to the Sixth District’s decision, then A.G.’s attorneys contend that the rules neither explicitly allow a child to participate nor prohibit a child from participating in a hearing in which he or she has a direct interest in the outcome.
A.G.’s attorneys assert that the trial court’s decision to keep A.G. from the hearing based on an exception in Juv.R. 1 for proceedings to determine a parent-child relationship directly contradicts the requirement in Juv.R. 27, which states that those who have a direct interest in a juvenile case may not be excluded from a hearing. They also contend that the father’s motion for unsupervised visitation was not a proceeding to determine the parent-child relationship.
A.G.’s attorneys suggest that the method courts use to determine whether a child is competent to testify as a witness in a trial could be similarly used to analyze whether courts should allow children to participate in juvenile court proceedings like this one. The Rules of Evidence state that a person is competent to be a witness if he or she is of sound mind and not under 10 years old.
Pointing to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the parallel due process section of the Ohio Constitution, A.G.’s attorneys assert that neither document makes a distinction about the age of the persons covered by its protections. Attorneys for A.G. conclude that A.G. was denied her due process rights by not being permitted to personally participate in the trial, and they add: “Absent a legitimate compelling public policy reason which outweighs the constitutional rights guaranteed to all persons, including those under the age of majority, these existing standards and practices which treat children differently than adult persons must be changed.”
Attorneys for A.G.’s father agree with the Sixth District that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in this case. In Wilburn v. Wilburn (2006), the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that, based on civil rules, a child does not have to be a party in a divorce custody case and the appointment of a guardian ad litem also doesn’t make a child a party to a divorce custody case. Attorneys for A.G.’s father argue that the same reasoning should be applied in this case.
While the father’s attorneys state that A.G. clearly has an interest in the proceedings, they contend that she has been given every opportunity to be heard. They also assert that if a 2008 decision by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Hanna v. Hanna were followed in this case, A.G. would have had no independent legal right separate from her parents, and none of her motions would have even been considered.
They contend that A.G. has a qualified right to testify, but minors don’t have an unqualified, constitutional right to be present during a domestic hearing. They conclude that the current law provides children whose parents are divorcing with both measures for protection and opportunities for participation.
A.G.’s mother did not file a brief in this case, so her attorneys will not be permitted to present an oral argument in this matter.