Of course not. It would still be commercial speech. Go to
Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Home Page and look up commercial speech and educate yourself.
Dicta is not holding and snippets is not the law. Please post the holding from the case you cited stating a golf course IS a park. You are wrong again. The golf course can limit people from being on it without paying. Can a park in the way you mean? By-the-by, have you looked up the issue of time, place and manner restrictions on even protected speech yet?
Please provide the holding of the case where the court stated that no contract can prevent another from a lawful trade on their property. Heck we don't even need a contract. You can't teach golf in the court house, on school grounds or in my front yard either.
The statue of frauds is not relevant--at least to you. You would have no standing to argue anything regarding it. In any event, this would not be one which of and concerns the land, but might apply if the contract *could not* be completed in a year. But, again, the statute of frauds would be irrelevant to you.
I'm done with you here. You choose your strategy, now you have to live with the civil procedure ramifications of it.
You have not made a cognizable case here. (Although I suspect when the full brief is read there may be one.) Each posting becomes worse as you make claims which clearly are not the law. The golf course is not preventing you from making a living, they are preventing you from your particular business plan. Entirely different things. (Arguendo, even if all your other claims were true.)
You are not going to win with your arguments. I once again suggest you remember you may be ordered to pay for the defense of this lawsuit. I also suggest you get an attorney to review your briefs at the bare minimum.
You say:
"Dicta is not holding and snippets is not the law."
Actually the entire Save Mile Square Park Comm' case was about one thing, and one thing only -- is or is not a government owned golf course a "park" in California? The California appellate court said a golf course is a "park." (That's not "dicta," that was the holding.)
You mention "time place and manner" restrictions"
This came up in a federal decision I read, a case cited by the Defendants actually, where that was the issue in the case of United States v. Kokinda 497 U.S. 720 (1990), where Justice Kennedy broke a 4-4 tie in the voting saying that "solicitation" as opposed to speech that is not involving directly asking for money, may be reasonably time place and manner restricted on a post office sidewalk -- which was by a 5-4 vote deemed to otherwise be a "traditional" public forum. But notice that the post office sidewalk was treated as a "traditional" public forum in that case. Indeed, what would be a reasonable "time place and manner" restriction as to me there? Never? Because that is the kind of a restriction I am up against now - never in the city or county. But, as you know, "time place and manner" restrictions only apply to "traditional public fora," so are you coming around to the notion that the golf courses are "parks" and so must be treated as such? If so, you are now thinking correctly.
I can tell you that I do NOT intend to solicit at all on the golf courses -- my students and I simply meet at the golf courses and go about our teacher-student business. I can tell you that even if I wanted to solicit on the properties I could do that, provided I was not "aggressive" about it -- a California Supreme Court decision (and I will cite cases later if you like, but I got to get out of here to go do some work, as a handyman, the only work I can find at the moment).
As to the semi-snide comment:
"Please provide the holding of the case where the court stated that no contract can prevent another from a lawful trade on their property. Heck we don't even need a contract. You can't teach golf in the court house, on school grounds or in my front yard either."
Of course, I don't want to teach golf in a courthouse or in your front yard, but only at the one place perfectly and expressly adapted to golf in the city and county -- a government owned golf course, which is a "park." (Note: "golf" is the very expressive activity to which the golf courses are dedicated.)
There is no case holding but clear and unambiguous statutes. You don't need a case holding to claim a statutory right.
You should also understand about the "essential facilities" doctrine of the Sherman Act, which is applicable to California's anti-trust statutes -- why don't you look that up, there are 4 elements which couldn't be more perfectly adapted to this very case (in other words I easily meet the elements of the doctrine). Thus, I do get to use the properties even if the properties are looked at as if "private" properties and not parks. But again the properties are "parks" and are not commercial operations of any kind, and, plain and simple, my students and I can gather, associate, talk about any subject, except one, of course. . .
As to the statute of frauds statement you make:
The contract between the city and county and their private partner cannot be completed in a year -- the contracts run for 5 year periods. But there is nothing in writing about giving the private partner an exclusive right to speak or teach golf on the properties (nor, lawfully, could there be). So how is the statutes of frauds "irrelevant" to me? I am the one suffering for some alleged contract restriction that affects ME, but where the restriction isn't even in writing but easily could have been put in writing.
So what about the fast track rules on petitions for writs of mandate on first amendment issues?
P.S. I looked at that website with essays on commercial speech. I am not advertising or soliciting on the properties. I am only assembling (with my students) and speaking to them about what they want to hear, and at a public park.
P.P.S. Why don't you look up the case of Wilson v. Cook (1987)197 Cal.App.3d 344, or the 9th Circuit case of Carreras v. City of Anaheim 768 F.2d 1039, 1044 (1985). You will see that solicitation might be banned, but restrictions on the mere use of a property in the intended manner by two consenting people would not be constitutional. (Indeed, I cannot even look like I am giving a lesson or I will be "removed" from the properties -- which should strike you as absurd.)