My other issue is that throughout the building there are cameras with completely visible microphones and no one informed me that I was being recorded. Right above my head at the counter where I was "conversing" with the lady that complained was a camera like this. She should have known that the conversation was being recorded because "they" were being recorded.
God, every time I come on here I feel like I'm talking to a bunch of idiots living in their parent's basement trying to play lawyer. YOU CAN FILE A LAWSUIT IN THE STATE OF OREGON IF YOU CAN PROVE THE STATE HAD NOT PROBABLE CAUSE AND I ALSO THAT THEY HAD AN IMPROPER MOTIVE TO PROSECUTE ME!!!!
There are two different things going on here. I beat the BURG AND THEFT CHARGES, that's where I am looking at a lawsuit for malicious prosecution. I went into the court building with a camera when I filed my Tort and then they "arrested" me.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993):YOU CAN FILE A LAWSUIT IN THE STATE OF OREGON IF YOU CAN PROVE THE STATE HAD NOT PROBABLE CAUSE AND I ALSO THAT THEY HAD AN IMPROPER MOTIVE TO PROSECUTE ME!!!!
There are two different things going on here. I beat the BURG AND THEFT CHARGES, that's where I am looking at a lawsuit for malicious prosecution. I went into the court building with a camera when I filed my Tort and then they "arrested" me.
n Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), we held that a state prosecutor had absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, including presentation of the state's case at trial. Noting that our earlier cases had been "predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it", id., at 421, we focused on the functions of the prosecutor that had most often invited common law tort actions. We concluded that the common law rule of immunity for prosecutors was "well settled" and that "the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under � 1983." Id., at 424. Those considerations [n.4] supported a rule of absolute immunity for conduct of prosecutors that was "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id., at 430. In concluding that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting theState's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under � 1983," we did not attempt to describe the line between a prosecutor's acts in preparing for those functions, some of which would be absolutely immune, and his acts of investigation or "administration," which would not. Id., at 431, and n. 33.
We first address petitioner's argument that the prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for the claim that they conspired to manufacture false evidence that would link his boot with the bootprint the murderer left on the front door. To obtain this false evidence, petitioner submits, the prosecutors shopped for experts until they found one who would provide the opinion they sought. App. 7-9. At the time of this witness shopping the assistant prosecutors were working hand in hand with the sheriff's detectives under the joint supervision of the sheriff and state's attorney Fitzsimmons.
Petitioner argues that Imbler's protection for a prosecutor's conduct "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case," 424 U. S., at 431, extends only to the act of initiation itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom. This extreme position is plainly foreclosed by our opinion in Imbler itself. We expressly stated that "the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom," and are nonetheless entitled to absolute immunity. Id., at 431, n. 33. We noted in particular that an out of court "effort to control the presentation of [a] witness' testimony" was entitled to absolute immunity because it was "fairly within [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate." Id., at 430, n. 32. To be sure, Burns made explicit the point we had reserved in Imbler, 424 U. S., at 430-431, and n. 33: A prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity. See Burns, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). We have not retreated, however, from the principle that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in thecourse of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.
ALTHOUGH I COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND HOW ONE WRITES AND THE RESPONSE SEEMS LIKE IT COMES FROM AN IDIOT. I get that sometimes too.Judicial immunity extends to prosecutors for acts performed in initiating prosecutions. Thus, a prosecutor is absolutely immune with respect to his or her decision as to "when, how, and against whom to proceed." Watts v. Gerking et al, 111 Or. 641, 222 P. 318, rev'd on other grounds on reh'g 111 Or. 654, 657, 228 P. 135 (1924); see also Jackson v. Mult. Co., 76 Or.App. 540, 545-46, 709 P.2d 1153 (1985). That principle was originally approved in Watts, where the plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action, alleging that the prosecutor had caused him to be arrested under the Prohibition laws knowing that the plaintiff had not, in fact, violated the law. The Supreme Court initially held that in those circumstances�where the prosecutor "maliciously caus[ed] the arrest of [a] party for a pretended offense, which, at the time of the arrest, he knew had not been committed at all"�the prosecutor was not entitled to avail himself of judicial immunity. Id. at 652-53, 222 P. 318. On rehearing, however, the court reversed itself and concluded that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for malicious prosecution. In so holding, the court acknowledged the potential for abuse of prosecutorial power but concluded that the public interest in "fearless" criminal prosecutors was paramount. Id. at 668, 228 P. 135; see also id. at 671-72, 228 P. 135 (McBride, C.J., specially concurring) ("[P]ublic policy dictates rather that one citizen should suffer some financial loss than that the district attorneys of the state should be harassed by actions, to defend which might require a large portion of their time, to which the public has a right, and a large portion of the emolument prescribed by law as compensation for their services; and that it is better on the whole, that redress be afforded by prosecutions for misconduct in office than that the results above indicated should be made possible.").
We and the Supreme Court have consistently reiterated that principle. See McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 437, 578 P.2d 1259 (1978) (citing Watts as illustrative of particular species of discretionary function immunity); Rogers v. Hill, 281 Or. 491, 499 n. 8, 576 P.2d 328 (1978) (noting that public prosecutors enjoy "absolute privilege" with respect to initiation of criminal prosecutions); Beason v. Harcleroad, 105 Or.App. 376, 381, 384, 805 P.2d 700 (1991) (affirming judgment on pleadings against malicious prosecution claim because "[p]rosecutors are immune from liability for civil damages on a malicious prosecution claim" under Oregon law but reversing judgment against claims based, inter alia, on prosecutors' issuance of press release because pleadings did not permit determination of whether, given content and timing of prosecutors' statements to media, those statements "ha[d] a sufficient relationship to afford a prosecutor a quasi-judicial immunity."); Jackson, 76 Or.App. at 545-46, 709 P.2d 1153 (prosecutor was absolutely immune from liability for alleged negligence in identifying arrestee in preparing and obtaining arrest warrant).